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Abstract—Machine learning inference engine is of great 
interest to smart edge computing. Compute-in-memory (CIM) 
architecture has shown significant improvements in throughput 
and energy efficiency for hardware acceleration. Emerging non-
volatile memory technologies offer great potential for instant on 
and off by dynamic power gating. Inference engine is typically pre-
trained by the cloud and then being deployed to the filed. There 
are new attack models on chip cloning and neural network model 
reverse engineering. In this paper, we propose countermeasures to 
the weight cloning and input-output pair attacks. The first 
strategy is the weight fine-tune to compensate the analog-to-digital 
converter (ADC) offset for a specific chip instance while inducing 
significant accuracy drop for cloned chip instances. The second 
strategy is the weight shuffle to allow accurate propagation of the 
activations of the neural network only with a key.  
Keywords—Machine learning, deep neural network, hardware 
accelerator, in-memory computing, cloning, reverse engineering 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the recent years, machine learning based on deep neural 
networks (DNNs) has achieved remarkable success in a variety 
of artificial intelligence applications such as image recognition, 
language translation, autonomous vehicle, etc. [1]. The success 
on algorithms also demands the development of a variety of 
hardware accelerators for their implementations from the could 
to the edge. Although the mainstream platform for the machine 
learning research today is GPUs at the cloud due to its 
computational power and programming flexibility, it is not an 
ideal choice for edge devices because of its huge power 
consumption. To this end, hardware accelerators based on 
application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) (e.g. Google’s 
TPU [2]) are becoming more and more popular. The primary 
challenge for machine learning acceleration is the frequent data 
movements back and forth between the computing units and the 
memory units. Therefore, compute-in-memory (CIM) [3] is 
proposed as a promising paradigm for inference acceleration 
since it overcomes the bottleneck of the conventional von 
Neumann architecture by emerging the computing units with the 
memory units. The crossbar nature of the memory array could 
boost the efficiency of vector-matrix multiplication (VMM) that 
is widely used in machine learning. The weights of DNNs are 
mapped as the conductance of the memory array, and the input 
is loaded in parallel as the voltage to the rows, then the 
multiplication is done in analog fashion and current summation 
along columns is used to generate the output. Generally, the 
CIM architecture could be implemented with SRAM (with 
modified bit cell [4]) or emerging non-volatile memories 
(eNVMs [5]). The eNVM based CIM is more attractive to edge 
devices since they are smaller in size (than SRAM) at the same 
technology node and will not lose data after power-off, thus do 
not need to reload DNN model again when power-up. In 
addition, they have zero leakage which is desired for the battery 
constrained edge devices. Prototype chips of eNVM based 
inference engine have been demonstrated in silicon recently, 
showing impressive energy efficiency 10~100 TOPS/W [6].  
However, the non-volatility of DNN model implemented in 
eNVMs also causes potential threats and vulnerabilities in 
inference engine. In general, eNVMs suffer from the data 
privacy problem if the raw data is stored on-chip without 
encryption [7]. For the CIM architecture, since the analog 
computation is utilized within the memory array, there is no way 
to perform the digital encryption. Memory cells have to hold raw 
data that directly represent the weights of DNN model. This 
property makes the CIM inference engine under the threats of 
the chip cloning and the model reverse engineering.  
Asset to be protected: The DNN model that is stored in the 
eNVMs based inference engine is identified as the asset to be 
protected. The DNN model owner gathers the training data and 
labels with great efforts and has to train the network with 
significant expenses of time and computational resources. If the 
adversary could easily obtain the DNN model without 
authorization, he/she could resell it or clone it into another fake 
chip. First, the training data itself may be private and labeling 
the training data is a non-trivial effort that typically involves 
human beings’ supervision. Second, the training of DNNs is 
expensive in terms of computational resources (e.g. cluster of 
GPUs) and time (e.g. weeks).  
Attack model 1): if the adversary could read-out the 
individual weights that are stored in eNVMs, then the adversary 
could reprogram (clone) the weights to another chip without 
going through the expensive training procedure. In general, 
micro-probing attack could be used to achieve this goal as a 
possible way to get around the expensive training procedure. 
According to [8], it may be challenging to directly probe the 
eNVM cell without physically damaging the neighboring cells 
because of its high density. Nevertheless, the adversary could 
directly probe the digital output from the periphery, e.g. the 
analog-to-digital converter (ADC). Though VMM computation 
does not require super high resolution ADC [9], CIM array is 
typically equipped with high resolution ADC for the write-
verify scheme to minimize the variations of the cell 
conductance. Individual cell’s conductance will be read out by 
such ADC and compared with the reference when initially 
loading the DNN models on-chip. The ADC output thus 
becomes a vulnerable spot.  
Attack model 2): if the adversary could run the inference 
engine and gather sufficient input-output pairs, and use them as 
a new dataset for DNN model reverse engineering. Attack 
model 2) has a lower entry bar for adversary than attack model 
1) as not everyone has the capability of micro-probing. The 
threat of input-output pair attack exists as long as the inference 
engine is supposed to generate the correct output given the input 
inquiry. Therefore, anyone who obsesses this chip could run the 
input-output gathering experiments. Obviously, adversary will 
take efforts to gather sufficient dataset, and it will not eliminate 
the expensive training procedure (e.g. cluster of GPUs and long 
training time). However, the adversary is possible to reverse 
engineer the DNN model without the initial private dataset.  
In this paper, we propose a DualSecure scheme to protect the 
DNN model deployed on the eNVM based inference engine by 
making it only accessible to an authorized user. To 
countermeasure attack model 1), we propose utilizing the 
process variations of the chip (e.g. ADC offset) to make the DNN 
model unique for individual chip instance. The DNN model has 
to be retrained and adapted to each chip instance’s variability 
anyway. Even the weights are micro-probed and cloned to other 
chip instances, they would perform inappropriately with low 
inference accuracy. To countermeasure attack model 2), we 
propose the input-output channel shuffle with a key so that only 
matched shuffle could perform accurate inference. The key is 
distributed by the DNN model owner to the authorized user only. 
Adversary without the key will not be able to generate the 
correct input-output pairs, thus could not gather the training 
dataset for model reverse engineering. We experiment our 
proposed scheme on an 8-layer VGG-like [10] network (VGG-
8) model on CIFAR-10 dataset, assuming an eNVM based 
inference engine manufactured at 40 nm node. The hardware 
overhead of the proposed DualSecure scheme is also evaluated.  
II. BACKGDOUND OF CIM AND ENVMS 
The recent success of artificial intelligence applications such 
as image recognition is mainly due to the convolutional neural 
network (CNN), which is a major class of DNNs. Convolution 
is an important mathematical operation widely used in image 
processing which extracts the features of images by filters. In the 
traditional image processing tasks, people manually design the 
filters’ weights in order to extract features such as edge, corner, 
etc. that they think useful to achieve their goals. The training 
process of CNN model is to learn the weights of filters 
iteratively from the training data with the backpropagation that 
is typically based on stochastic gradient descent method. The 
inference operation of convolution is essentially the vector-
matrix multiplication (VMM). The crossbar nature of eNVMs 
array is a natural substrate for implementing VMM in a highly 
parallel manner. As shown in Fig. 1(a), the crossbar array 
consists of perpendicular rows and columns with the eNVMs 
cell located at each cross-point. The weights in the filters are 
mapped as conductance of the eNVMs. The VMM operation is 
performed as follows: read voltages representing the input 
feature map are applied to all the rows so that the read voltages 
are multiplied by the conductance of the eNVMs at each cross-
point. The current through each device is summed up along 
columns. Different columns represent filters for different output 
channels, who should see the same input thus all the columns 
work at the same time in parallel. Typically, ADCs are needed 
at the end of the column to convert the analog current to the 
digital output so that the subsequent processing such as 
activation and pooling could be performed in the digital domain.  
eNVMs of interests include resistive random access memory 
(RRAM), phase change memory (PCM), spin-transfer-torque 
magnetic random access memory (STT-MRAM) and 
ferroelectric field effect transistor (FeFET). In the recent years, 
industry has heavily invested in eNVM R&D with commercial 
processes available, e.g. TSMC 40nm RRAM [11] and Intel 
22nm RRAM [12], TSMC 40nm PCM [13], Intel 22nm STT-
MRAM [14] and Samsung 28 nm STT-MRAM [15], while 
doped HfO2 based FeFET technology is also emerging, e.g. 
Globalfoundries 22nm FeFET [16]. Capitalizing on these 
progresses, eNVMs based CIM inference engines have also 
become viable. Most of these industrial processes offer only 
binary cell, thus we assume 1-bit per cell in this work.  
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Fig. 1. (a) The crossbar CIM architecture with eNVMs. (b) Two map method to 
map the convolution filter to the memory column. 
Generally, the weights of the convolutional layer is a 4D 
matrix of size 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 × 𝑘𝑘1  × 𝑘𝑘2 . 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  denotes the channel 
depth of the 3D input tensor of size 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 
decides the depth of output tensor of size 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 × 𝑊𝑊𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 × 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 
The weight matrix is applied to the input tensor as a sliding 
window of size 𝑘𝑘1  × 𝑘𝑘2. To implement the convolutional layers 
in memory, there are two kinds of mapping methods to map the 
model weights to the memory array as shown in Fig. 1(b). Both 
of them view the weight matrix as 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 number of 3D tensor of 
size 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑘𝑘1  × 𝑘𝑘2. The conventional mapping method stretch 
the 3D kernel into a long vector and put them in one column of 
the memory array. Along the row direction, different columns 
work for different output channels at the same time, so there 
should be 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  number of columns in total for each layer. In 
deep networks, the depth of the input channel and output channel 
could be very large that make it hard to fit weights of one layer 
in a single array considering slow access and extra energy 
consumption. Array partitioning [17] can be introduced to 
parallelize the computation into multiple sub-arrays. It is noted 
that the input data will be reused significantly for convolution as 
the sliding window moves over the input tensor. To realize the 
input data reuse practically, a novel mapping methods proposed 
in [18]. In this method, the weights at different spatial location 
of each kernel into different sub-kernels. In other words, the 3D 
kernel is cut into several 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 1 × 1  vectors and for each 
kernel there are 𝑘𝑘1  × 𝑘𝑘2 of them. These sub-kernels are mapped 
into different subarrays. Because of the window sliding manner 
of convolution, sub-kernels of each position will see the input to 
their neighbor at the window sliding direction. In this case, by 
passing the used input vectors in the same direction as the kernel 
“slides over” the input tensor, the input vectors can be reused 
among the subarrays efficiently. Besides the convolutional layer, 
there is often another type of layer used in the CNN model which 
is called fully connected layer. The fully connect layer could be 
viewed as a special case of 𝑘𝑘1 = 𝑘𝑘2 = 1 and the input tensor of 
size 1 × 1 × 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , thus could also be mapped to the memory 
array for calculation. 
III. RELATED WORK 
While the neural networks get more and more popular in the 
real life applications, the security vulnerabilities of it becomes a 
big problem to worry about. On one side, the neural network 
itself could be adversarial attacked, poison attacked, etc., that 
prevent it to work properly. On the other side, the neural network 
models become a valuable profit since it could bring business 
advantage. Attacks like model stealing will ease the life of 
attackers to get a well-trained model or training dataset 
information and cause profit loss for the model owners. 
  The adversarial attack currently is the most widely studied 
attack on DNN-based decision making tasks [19,20]. 
Adversarial examples, which could be defined as “inputs formed 
by applying small but intentionally worst-case perturbations to 
examples from the dataset, such that the perturbed input results 
in the model outputting an incorrect answer with high 
confidence”[20], could hurt the functionality of neural network 
models while are not a problem for human decision. In physical 
worlds, camera noise, stick on the target object, etc. may lead to 
adversarial examples causing safety-critical situations like self-
driving car. There are a lot of defend methods proposed for this 
kind of attack [21,22,23], most of which are mainly software 
technique. Poisoning attack is an attack type that happens during 
the training of the ML model. Generally, it is done by injecting 
bad data into the training dataset so that the model achieve good 
performance [24] or become more fragile during test [25]. 
Defense technique like [26,27,28] are proposed to protect model 
from this type to some extent. But still no one for all method 
found currently.    
The functionality aimed attack are general despite the 
platform on which the model work and could be solved by 
algorithm effort from software side. So it out of the 
consideration of our CIM inference engine. The attack types that 
try to copy or recreate a model are more import for our hardware 
developer since not all defense method are applicable because 
the property of the hardware.  
Model stealing becomes a problem as the machine learning 
application move from research field to the business interest. As 
an example, machine-learning-as-a-service offer well trained 
model on secured cloud and charge others for access based on 
pay-per-query. Even though the model could worked as black 
box, it is proved that the model could be extracted with 
prediction APIs with limited query[29]. While this problem treat 
user as potential adversary so that the defense method is to limit 
the information available to the user or add some tricks on the 
model to make it hard to be extracted, condition is a little 
different for the CIM edge device case since the model is local. 
It hard to count the query number to a local chip and the model 
works as white box as all the weights are available locally. The 
model is viewed as part of the chip to be authorized to the user. 
So in this case, user pay for the chip(model) instead of query.   
 So in this paper we treat the unauthorized user as adversary. 
The model could be stolen as chip clone for the CIM edge 
device. Considering the capability of micro-probing for chip 
clone, an easier attack method is to extract model from input-
output pair since this could be physically achieved by any person 
and would come back to work as power on since we consider 
the eNVM-based CIM chip. Previous work [8] have propose a 
method to prevent input output pair attack by utilize the 
memristors obsolescence effect. The accuracy will decrease 
with use so that the edge need to require a secured training 
dataset from the base station to retrain the model on chip. Only 
the authorized user will be able to decrypt the training dataset 
for use. This method will cause big data transfer between cloud 
and device and need the chip to be equipped with the training 
functionality, which will be more complicated than the inference 
only chip. Our method is more focused on inference chip and 
general to any eNVM devices since we do not rely on any 
property of the device itself. We didn’t consider the non-ideality 
of the cell, which should be reduced as much as possible for a 
good device. Although we also apply some training steps on the 
chip, but it is hybrid so that the chip is inference only after 
shipped to the user.  
IV. DUALSECURE PROTECTION SCHEME 
We propose a DualScheme to protect the eNVM based CIM 
inference engine. On one side, the DNN model on individual 
chip is fine-tuned to fit the ADC offset specified to that chip so 
that it performs poorly on other chips. In this way, the cloned 
weights becomes useless as ADC offset could not be cloned. On 
the other side, to prevent input-output pair attack, the weights’ 
input channels are shuffled when programed to the CIM array. 
A key is needed to shuffle the output from the previous layer to 
the same order to match the input to the weight matrix of the 
next layer. The key is only distributed to the authorized user, and 
will be temporarily stored on volatile on-chip SRAM array so 
that it could not obtained by the adversary after power-off. 
A. ADC offset variation modeling 
ADC is one of the most important periphery circuits for the 
CIM architecture and has a significant impact on the inference 
accuracy. Prior work has suggested that even with fine-tuned 
linear/nonlinear reference levels, ADC quantization (less than 
full precision of the partial sum of VMM) will introduce a slight 
accuracy loss [9]. What makes situation worse is the process 
variations in the actually fabricated chips (e.g. transistor 
threshold voltage variation, eNVM cell conductance variation). 
The intrinsic ADC offset makes the partial sum read-out from 
one memory sub-array different from the correct value after 
quantization. Though advanced sensing offset cancellation 
techniques are possible but with significantly increased area 
[30], CIM architecture has very tight column pitch where ADC 
size needs to be minimized to maintain the parallelism of the 
VMM computation.  
From the security point of view, we could leverage the 
process variations to protect CIM inference engine, which is 
similar to the concept of physical unclonable function (PUF) 
[31]. Our main goal here is to retrain the DNN model and make 
it adapt to each chip’s variation, thus the model is unique to each 
chip. We first identify the primary variation source to be utilized. 
eNVM cell conductance variation is manually controllable (e.g. 
by aggressive write-verify [32] to tighten the sigma of variation), 
thus it may not be an ideal source. Instead, ADC offset (for a 
given circuit topology) is purely defined by manufacturing, thus 
it is preferred as the source. We could fine-tune the weights to 
fit the ADC offset pattern of a specific chip so that even the same 
weights will not perform well for the other chips. 
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Fig. 2. (a) Latch-based current-mode SA. (b) Sense pass rate for 5-bit ADC. 
Generally, there are two types of ADC architecture used in 
CIM: Flash-ADC and SAR-ADC. The main component in both 
ADCs that contribute to offset is the sense amplifier (SA). Flash-
ADC uses different SAs for different levels and uses encoder to 
convert the thermometer code to the binary code. SAR-ADC has 
only one SA but compares for several iterative cycles as a binary 
tree search to the correct level. We will explore both ADC 
designs to implement our proposed scheme. Generally, there are 
two types of SA: voltage mode (VSA) and current mode (CSA). 
While both SAs could be used in CIM architecture, VSA has 
less offset than CSA [33]. Since we propose taking advantages 
of the offset, we choose CSA in this work. Specifically, we use 
a simple latch based CSA as shown in Fig. 2 (a), to minimize the 
area of ADC. 
In order to obtain the practical ADC offset pattern, we run 
Monte Carlo simulations in SPICE with TSMC 40nm PDK, 
which is a technology node that TSMC offers RRAM [11]. We 
found that the CSA offset is related to both the width of 
transistors and the column current value. In an analysis of 5-bit 
ADC, the sense pass rate decreases with increasing partial sum 
level (or increasing column current) as shown in Fig. 2 (b). If 
on-state resistance (Ron) of the eNVMs is smaller, the current 
to be sensed is larger, and the sense pass rate is lower. This trend 
could be explained as follows: ideally the differential sensing is 
determined by the relative strength of Ron of the eNVMs and 
that of the reference cell. When the column current becomes 
larger as partial sum increases, the voltage drop on the eNVMs 
becomes less and the conductance of the differential input pair 
transistors tend to dominate, thus the output is more decided by 
the intrinsic variation of the differential input pair of the CSA.  
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Here the sense pass rate is defined as the probability to sense 
correctly between the partial sum (Psum) and its nearest 
reference (Iref). We treat ADC offset as the distance that Iref 
shifting away from its ideal value, and we assume the Iref 
distribution follows the Gaussian function. The sense pass rate 
is interpreted as the cumulative probability of Iref being smaller 
than the Psum as the blue shade area shown in Fig. 3 (a). We 
could reversely obtain the sigma of Iref shift from the sense pass 
rate based on the cumulative probability function of Gaussian. 
For each SA, since the offset is caused by manufacturing, the 
Iref shift is a spatial variation and it will be stationary over time. 
For a 5-bit Flash ADC, there are 31 different SAs which may 
have different shifts from each other. For the SAR ADC, since 
the same SA is always used, for each level, the Iref should be 
shifted to the same direction. Based on the observation that the 
sigma over mu ratio is increased with Iref (Fig. 3(b)), we scale 
up the absolute shift value (normalized to Iref) by the ratio 
between them. 
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Fig. 4. Simulated ADC output with offset sampled from the Iref distribution 
based on the sense pass rate for different W/L for Flash-ADC and SAR-ADC. 
From the DNN model’s perspective, the Iref shift could be 
viewed as partial sum quantization bias. For Flash-ADC, since 
each shift is independent, somehow these random shifts could 
compensate each other. But for SAR-ADC, the bias favors in 
one direction. As shown in Fig. 4. SAR-ADC has bigger 
variation when sensing the same partial sum than Flash-ADC. 
Increasing transistor size (e.g. W/L) will reduce the mismatch, 
thus increasing the sense pass rate. In this work, as we embrace 
the process variations, SAR-ADC is a better choice for 
improving security as we will retrain the DNN model anyway.   
We now discuss the DNNs model retrain methods. A 
software-hardware hybrid method is used to fine-tune the 
weights after manufacturing for each chip, which means the 
feedforward propagation (inference) is done on-chip and the rest 
steps (error calculation, gradient calculation, and weight update) 
are done off-chip by software. For a specific chip, we will run 
the inference in hardware using its own ADC offset pattern with 
input images (selected from one epoch of 50,000 CIFAR-10 
images as the retrain dataset), then we will compare the 
prediction of the inference with the ideal label for the loss 
function. With the estimated loss, we will run the 
backpropagation to calculate the weight update in software. 
Then we reprogram the conductance of the eNVMs with write-
verify to the new weights. The weights of the entire neural 
network is susceptible to retrain. Typically, 1~2 retrain epoch is 
needed to achieve a reasonably high accuracy for a specific chip. 
In our evaluation, for the inference, the input and weights are 
converted to binary sequences so that the VMM result of them 
will be the normalized partial sum current. Then this value will 
be mapped to the ADC output with offset by one group of 
sampled reference currents from the distribution as in Fig. 3(a). 
Finally, the actual output with offset will be converted back to 
decimal value as the output feature map and saved for error and 
gradient calculation. The backpropagation and weight update 
are all directly use floating-point calculation as in software.  
B. Output-Input channel shuffle 
Generally, in order to protect the data, the data should be 
encrypted so that even the unauthorized user read it out, he/she 
is not able to be decrypt it without the key. However, for the 
eNVM based CIM inference engine, if we encrypt the weights 
that are stored in the memory array, we have to read out 
individual weight and decrypt it with the key for digital 
calculation. Essentially, the analog computation within the 
memory array is compromised, as it is no longer in-memory 
computing but more like near-memory computing. In addition, 
it is slow and energy-inefficient to read the weights row-by-row 
and decrypt them at the edge of the array for the subsequent 
digital multiply-and-accumulate operations.  
Since it is difficult to directly encrypt the weights, another 
method for obfuscating the unauthorized user is to play tricks on 
the input. The inference of DNN model is typically conducted 
layer by layer, it is important for each channel to receive the 
correct input from the previous layer’s output. This requires that 
the input to the CIM memory array’s rows always being 
matched. Even if the calculation of the previous layer is correct, 
as the following layer sees the incorrect input feature map paired 
with the weights, all the subsequent calculation will be incorrect. 
Hence, we propose shuffling the weights when programmed into 
the CIM memory array. Meanwhile the input feature map has to 
be shuffled in the same way so that the channel of the input and 
the weight matrix match. What we need to protect is the shuffle 
scheme, without which the adversary could not perform VMM 
correctly if using the weights the stored on-chip. This shuffle 
scheme could be saved on cloud as a key and each time could be 
downloaded upon the user or chip’s successful authentication. 
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Fig. 5. Architecture of the CIM-based Output-Input channel shuffle method. 
SRAM array stores shuffle pattern, and eNVM array stores weight pattern.  
To minimize the impact on inference latency, we design the 
shuffle in the CIM fashion. In particular, we propose using a 
SRAM-based CIM array to perform the shuffle. Each column of 
the SRAM array stores one hot code to present the shuffle 
scheme for certain input channel. The output of the SRAM array 
will be the shuffled channel that matches the weight channel 
order as shown in Fig. 5. The pseudo-input (from the previous 
layer’s output) is loaded into the SRAM array’s row. Given the 
shuffle pattern, the column output from SRAM array will be the 
real-input for the eNVMs array where the weights are stored.  
We choose to use SRAM to store shuffle pattern based on 
the following considerations. First, we do not wish to store the 
shuffle scheme on-chip during power-off. Second, each time 
when starting inference, we need to write the shuffle pattern (one 
hot code) back into the CIM array, it takes much less time and 
power to write SRAM than writing eNVMs. Since each column 
is one hot coded, the column output will be either 1 or 0. The 
CIM array just needs 1-bit SA instead of multi-bit ADC. The 
modifications to this SRAM array is to replace decoder with 
switch matrix as we have to open all the rows for parallel 
computation. The disadvantage of using SRAM over eNVMs is 
that the area is larger. We will explore the associated hardware 
overhead in the next section. 
 The question is how safe will this method be. For naïve 
consideration, this method could be attacked by the brute and 
force method. Let’s check the effort needed to attack an array of 
size N. The probability to find the exact key is obviously small 
when N is large. However, the network is not need all the input-
output channel match to work. Assume n out of N total digits 
matched between the real key and a random key, we want to find 
the probability as a function of n. It is not easy to find the exact 
number of it. However we know that this value is smaller than 
the probability of at least n digits match and further smaller than 
the equation 1. So that we have an upper bound of the probability 
to find a key have n digits matched with the real key.  
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It is obvious that the bigger the array is, the harder to break 
the key for shuffling. Since the length of the key is related to 
input channel depth of the layer, dependents on the model 
structure, the input channel depth may not be high enough to get 
a strong key. So in order to further increase the security level, 
we could insert some fake rows into the weight array. These fake 
row should not change the partial sum during propagation of the 
data. This could be down by making the input of the row to be 
zero, which means we have to insert zero into the input of the 
weight. This could be done by inset zero column in to the shuffle 
array as shown in Fig. 6. Since the zero insertion don’t need to 
care about the order so it does not mean to increase N directly. 
The upper bound is changed to 
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 = ��𝑁𝑁
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Fig. 6. Architecture of the CIM-based Output-Input channel shuffle with zero 
insertion method. SRAM array stores shuffle pattern, and eNVM array stores 
weight pattern with some fake weights inserted.  
V. EVALUTION RESULTS 
Our evaluation on the algorithm-level performance is done 
by the PyTorch platform [34], and the hardware performance is 
estimated by the NeuroSim framework for CIM [35]. We 
evaluate the CIFAR-10 image classification on a VGG-8 model. 
The basic setting for inference precision is that activations 
(input) are 8-bit and the weights are 2-8 bit. Our software 
baseline accuracy is ~92%. Binary RRAM with Ron=20kΩ is 
used as the eNVMs technology in this work.  
A. Retrain for ADC offset and immunity for weight cloning 
We first test the inference accuracy with the ADC offset on 
the original model that is pre-trained by software (e.g. in the 
cloud), which means we have not considered any retrain to 
specific chip at the edge. It is seen from Fig. 7 that for the same 
W/L, SAR-ADC could introduce more accuracy drop than 
Flash-ADC although the SA sense pass rate is kept at the same. 
This is in agreement with discussions in Section Ⅲ on the 
possible compensation of the quantized partial sum for Flash-
ADC. As W/L decreases, the accuracy drops more due to larger 
mismatch and lower sense pass rate. 
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Fig. 7 Inference accuracy distribution of software trained model (VGG-8 on 
CIFAR-10) with ADC offset. 
Fig. 8 shows the retrain curve of Flash-ADC and SAR-ADC 
with different W/L (thus different offset) for one specific chip. 
Flash-ADC could be retrained to recover the accuracy, however 
Flash-ADC has a small initial accuracy drop as it may not be 
preferred for security purpose as discussed above. We also vary 
the weight precision of SAR-ADC and evaluate its impact on 
retrain performance. It is seen that as the W/L decreases, it will 
be more difficult to retrain the model to recover the accuracy 
under process variations. For the same W/L, higher weight 
precision will be more robust to the variations and thus sees less 
accuracy drop and easier retrain recovery. To balance security 
and performance, SAR-ADC with precisely chosen W/L should 
be used.  
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Fig. 8 Retrain curve of different ADC type and weight precision for a specific 
chip with certain ADC offset. 
Now we assume Attack model 1) occurs on this specific chip. 
The adversary is able to micro-probe each RRAM cell’s 
conductance accurately and is able to reprogram the weights to 
another chip accurately by write-verify. We evaluate the 
effectiveness of our countermeasure scheme by exploiting the 
ADC offset, which the adversary has no control on another chip. 
We applied the retrained weights of this specific chip to other 
chips that have different ADC offset patterns. Based on the 
observation from the retrain curve of SAR-ADC in Fig. 8, we 
choose W/L=6 for 2-bit weight and W/L=5 for 4/8-bit weights 
as the design specs for the chip. First, we run several retrain tests 
to show that the recovery of accuracy to ~91% is not a one-time 
coincidence (Fig. 9(a)). Then, we apply the retrained model to 
other chips assuming the weights are cloned to other chips. As 
shown in Fig. 9(b), the retrained model does result in relatively 
low accuracy 40%~70% when applied to other chips that may 
have different ADC offset patterns. Essentially we utilize retrain 
to enhance the accuracy for this specific chip against the process 
variations, while rely on the process variations to hamper the 
accuracy for other chips. Adversary could just clone the weights 
but could not clone the same performance to other chip 
instances. Nevertheless, by micro-probing the adversary obtains 
the weights in the DNN model and can still resell the model itself 
in the software format (though the model may not be generalized 
as high accuracy is only associated with this ADC offset pattern 
specific to this chip). Therefore, this attack become invaluable.    
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Fig. 9 (a) Inference accuracy distribution of retrained model with ADC offset 
on this specific chip. (b) Inference accuracy distribution of retrained model 
applied on other chips.  
B. Output-Input channel shuffle 
First we check the hardware overhead introduced by the 
shuffle unit. We set the RRAM subarray size to 128×128 and 
SAR-ADC as 5-bit. The detailed hardware configurations are 
shown in Table I and the performance is evaluated at 40 nm node 
by NeuroSim. It is seen that the SRAM array (shuffle array) 
could be read in parallel, and it is much faster than the VMM 
computation in the RRAM array. Thus, shuffle array could be 
shared by several weight array without introducing significant 
delay overhead. It is noted that the SRAM array is larger than 
the RRAM array. When the weight precision is low, the 
overhead is quite large if all the layers in the neural network are 
equipped with the shuffle array (e.g. ~50% for 2-bit weight). 
Fortunately, as shown later it is not necessary to shuffle every 
layer to ensure security, thus the total overhead could be 
maintained to an acceptable level.  
Component Spec. Area (mm2) 
Latency 
(ns) 
Energy 
(pJ/op) 
RRAM array 128×128 (1 bit per cell) 855.436 
32.027 55.2594 wlSwitchMatrix   350.644 
slSwitchMatrix   236.357 
SAR-ADC 5-bit (×16 ) 5221.339 112.945 85.174 
ShiftAdd 14-bit (×16 ) 1012.92 0.84 10.07 
Total   7029.7 145.813 150.5 
SRAM array 128×128 5994.12 
1.251 
3.3 
wlSwitchMatrix  1293.773 2.825 
precharger   511.527 5.176 
WriteDriver  511.527 0 0 
SenseAmp 1-bit (×128 ) 334.705 0.12 23.552 
Total   8645.652 1.371 34.853 
Table I. Hardware configurations and performance for RRAM CIM array 
(weight array) vs. SRAM CIM array (shuffle array). 
 Now we assume Attack model 2) occurs as adversary tries 
to run this inference engine to gather the input-output pairs. We 
evaluate the effectiveness of our countermeasure scheme using 
channel shuffle as follows. First, we assume the weights of all 
the convolutional layers are shuffled except the first one since 
the channel depth of the input images is just 3 (for RGB 
channels) thus it is easy to guess with limited shuffle 
combinations. Furthermore, we do not add shuffle to the fully 
connected (FC) layer since the weight sharing is low for FC 
layer so the penalty of input shuffle will be relatively high. Since 
the adversary does not have prior knowledge about the key used 
for shuffle, we assume that a random key is used by the 
adversary. Fig. 10 shows the inference accuracy under randomly 
generated key for (a) different number of shuffle layers in the 
network and (b) one layer but in different locations of the 
network. It is seen that even one shuffle layer results in very low 
(<20%) inference accuracy. Therefore, we will use one-layer 
shuffle scheme and evaluate its hardware overhead. Fig. 11 
shows the entire chip overhead in terms of (a) area and (b) 
energy. Adding shuffle to shallow layers (such as conv2) 
introduces small area overhead than deeper layers since the 
channel depths are smaller for shallow layers. Lower weight 
precision (thus smaller RRAM array) will make the SRAM 
shuffle array takes more portion of area, thus larger area 
overhead. The energy overhead is comparable regardless where 
the shuffle layer is, because channel depths increase while size 
of input feature map decreases as layer goes deeper. This means 
that there will be less shuffle arrays working for more cycles at 
shallow layers while more arrays working for less cycles at deep 
layers. 
 Considering the shuffle operation consumes additional 
power, it is undesired to shuffle all the bits when the weight 
precision is high (e.g. 8-bit). By observing the accuracy drop 
trend in Fig. 12, we found shuffling the 1st and 2nd most 
significant bit (MSB) is critical for reducing accuracy while the 
energy consumption will increase linearly as increasing the 
number of bits to be shuffled. It is noted that in hardware design 
we map different significant bits into different RRAM arrays 
and perform shift and add to obtain the final sum. Therefore, 
adding shuffle to some MSB arrays is possible.   
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Fig. 10. (a) Inference accuracy distribution vs. different number of layers with 
a random key. (b) Inference accuracy distribution of one layer but different 
locations in the network with a random key.  
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Fig. 11. (a) Area overhead with respect to the location of shuffle array. (b) 
Energy overhead with respect to the location of shuffle array 
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Fig. 12. Tradeoff between inference accuracy and energy overhead based on 
the number of bits shift from MSB to LSB.  
 Then, let’s check the effect of number of matched digits on 
the accuracy. From Fig. 13, we found that with the increase 
number of matched digits, the accuracy degradation will 
decrease. If half of the digits N/2=64 is matched, the accuracy 
degradation is not enough for security consideration. However, 
from the equation 1, we know that the probability boundary of n 
digits matched out of N=128 is shown as Fig.14. Even for half 
of position match, it is a very small probability for brute and 
force attack. 
 
Fig. 13 Accuracy under different number of digits match between real key and 
random key. 
 
Fig. 14 Probability upper bound for different number of digits match between 
real key and random key. An experiment is run to generate random key and 
check the frequency of matched digits with the real key. It could be see that it 
match the upper bound result when n is small. For big n, since the sample points 
is limited, no result is viewed.   
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Fig.15 Effect of zero insertion on the probability of number of matched digits 
 
 We assume a small Cin layer which has N=32 and check 
how will inserting 16 fake zeros affect the probability. For Fig. 
15 we could see that with zero inserted, probability of matched 
digits decrease faster than the original case. The problem of this 
method is that it introduce hardware overhead one the shuffle 
array. And people may argue that normally the input channel 
depth may get bigger as the model get deeper. If the shallow 
layer is not deep enough, then guard one that is deeper. The point 
is that the model generally is defined without knowing the 
hardware setting. It may be hard to find the proper depth to 
balance the hardware overhead and the security power. With 
zero insertion, we could insert proper number of zeros to make 
array size desired while increasing the security level. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 In this paper, new threats of eNVM based machine learning 
inference engine are identified including the weight cloning and 
model reverse engineering.  We proposed a DualSecure scheme 
against these vulnerabilities. Our evaluation results show that by 
utilizing the process variations (i.e., ADC offset), the DNN 
model could be retrained to maintain high accuracy on each 
individual chip while their performance will significantly 
degrades on other chips even with cloned weights. While this 
method could effectively countermeasure chip cloning, the 
model reverse engineering by input-output pair attack is still 
possible. We further propose to add an SRAM-based CIM 
shuffle array so that a key is needed to match the input channel 
with the weight matrix. By applying the shuffle scheme on just 
one shallow layer and the first two MSB bits of the weights in 
the network, it could achieve high security with relatively low 
overhead for area, latency and energy. We also check the 
security strength of this shuffled array method and proposed 
zero insertion method to balance the software define model 
depth and the security level. This work raises the new research 
directions in the machine learning hardware security beyond the 
software adversarial attack.       
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